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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at providing additional and more complete results regarding monetary 
policy transmission in the eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
recently integrated to EU. More precisely, our purpose is to assess the relative 
importance of each of the three monetary policy channels usually acknowledged in the 
literature (the interest rate, the exchange rate, the domestic credit) for these countries. In 
the general frame of Vectorial AutoRegressive (VAR) models, this is done by 
estimating different specifications for each country. Consequently, we alternatively 
include money and domestic credit aggregates on the one hand, and industrial 
production and rebuilt series of GDP on the other hand. Our results emphasize already 
existing similarities with the euro zone, and an ongoing homogenization process. Thus, 
the empirical evidence incites to be reasonably optimistic regarding the relevance of a 
close integration of these countries into euro area.   
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Résumé  
 
   Cet article propose une vue d'ensemble des mécanismes de transmission de la 
politique monétaire dans les huit pays d'Europe centrale et orientale (PECO) récemment 
admis au sein de l'Union Européenne. Plus précisément, son objectif consiste à évaluer 
l'importance relative de chacun des trois canaux de transmission de la politique 
monétaire habituellement mis en avant dans la littérature, à savoir le canal du taux 
d'intérêt, le canal du taux de change et le canal du crédit. A cet effet, nous estimons 
différents modèles Vectorial AutoRegressive (VAR) pour chaque pays. Les 
spécifications testées incluent ainsi à tour de rôle un agrégat monétaire ou un indicateur 
de crédit domestique d'un côté, et un indice de production industrielle ou une série 
reconstruite de PIB de l'autre. Les résultats révèlent des similarités déjà présentes avec 
la zone euro, ainsi qu'un processus en cours de convergence et d'homogénéisation. 
L'analyse empirique invite donc à être raisonnablement optimiste quant à la pertinence 
d'une intégration rapide des pays concernés au sein de la zone euro. 
 
 
Classification JEL : E52, E58, F47 
Mots-clés : transmission de la politique monétaire, modèles VAR, PECO 
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1. Introduction 
The recent integration into European Union (EU) of Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia on the one hand, and 
the now imminent adoption of the euro for some of them on the other1, renew crucial 
interrogations about European Monetary Union (EMU) consistency and the practical 
implementation of the Eurosystem’s monetary strategy. As many view the EU-12 or 
EU-15 as an area lacking heterogeneity in monetary policy transmission mechanisms2 
(see Cechetti, 1999), the conventional wisdom considers that the integration of Central 
and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) is going to increase this heterogeneity. From the 
European Central Bank (ECB) point of view, this may complicate greatly the evaluation 
of the relevant scheduling and magnitude of interest rate variation3. For the members 
countries, this may lead to heavy distortions in monetary policy effects, with some 
reacting strongly and/or quickly to a monetary shock, while others will react weakly 
and/or gradually.  
The knowledge of monetary policy transmission mechanisms for the eight 
newcomers to EMU is therefore a key economic issue to consider. Therefore, this paper 
wants to provide additional and more complete empirical evidence concerning the 
relative importance of each of the three monetary policy channels usually acknowledged 
in the literature, namely the interest rate of course, but also the exchange rate, and the 
credit channel, for all eight aforementioned CEECs. To our best knowledge, our study is 
the first to provide such an exhaustive investigation of monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms for such a large number of accession countries4. In the general frame of 
Vectorial AutoRegressive (VAR) models, this is done by estimating different 
specifications for each country. Indeed, we alternatively use money and domestic credit 
aggregates on the one hand, and industrial production and Gross Domestic Product 
                                                 
1 Mid-2006 for Estonia, 2007 for Slovenia and Lithuania. 
2 However, Mojon and Peersman (2003)’s results lead to debate this widely accepted statement. 
3 Considering the operational framework of the European single policymaker, it may even question the 
adequacy of the inflation target “close to 2% over the medium term”. 
4 Creel and Levasseur (2005) do investigate several channels of monetary policy transmission, but only 
for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Conversely, Elbourne and de Haan (2006) look at ten accession 
countries but they focus only on interest rate shocks. Studying the same ten countries, Ganev et al. (2002) 
also consider exchange rate shocks, but they do not provide confidence bands for their estimates, making 
consequently very difficult any comparison with other research. 
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(GDP) on the other hand, the latter being rebuilt thanks to the interpolation method of 
Chow and Lin (1971). 
While most of related empirical studies (see Ganev et al., 2002, for a survey) 
emphasize the exchange rate as the main and most powerful channel for monetary 
policy transmission in the CEECs, we show that its influence is decreasing relatively to 
interest rate channel and even to the credit one. For all countries, monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms already present important similarities with those of the old 
euro area members, but also seem to keep homogenizing in their direction. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a short 
overview of theoretical underpinning and related literature. Section 3 exposes the VAR 
specifications we are going to draw on, as well as methodological and econometric 
concerns. The outcomes of our analysis are detailed and commented in section 4. 
Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Monetary Macroeconomics for CEECs 
 Stating the failure of conventional macroeconomics models in terms of forecasting 
abilities, Sims (1980) proposed an alternative way of modelling, with no other 
restrictions than the variables chosen and the number of lags. While relying on a 
parsimonious set of variables, VAR models show indeed very good abilities to study 
economic fluctuations and more generally good identification properties. Consequently, 
there have been many studies using VAR specifications in order to analyze monetary 
policy effects, in the United States (see Leeper et al., 1998, or Christiano et al., 1999) 
and more recently across EMU members (see Mojon and Peersman, 2003). They seem 
especially relevant in the case of transition countries, for which it may be hazardous to 
use structural models built upon neo-classical hypotheses (cf. Ganev et al., 2002) and 
generally relying on stronger identifying assumptions than VAR ones (cf. Amato and 
Gerlach, 2001). 
VAR framework has been hardly applied to CEECs until today, however. Apart 
from studies dealing with one or two specific cases (see for example Maliszewski, 
1999; Christoffersen et al., 2001, Horska, 2001; Gottscchalk and Moore, 2001; Kuijs, 
2002; Botel, 2002 or Maliszewski, 2002), only three studies (Ganev et al., 2002; Creel 
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and Levasseur, 2005 and Elbourne et de Haan, 2006) deal with a comparative explicit 
investigation of monetary policy transmission in these countries.  
The purpose of this paper is therefore to keep on the path of the few aforementioned 
articles, by providing a substantial cross-country analysis able to complete the current 
main empirical conclusions regarding monetary policy transmission in the CEECs. 
Indeed, among the three channels - interest rate, exchange rate and credit channel - 
usually considered for analyzing monetary policy transmission effects on key variables 
like output or inflation, the strong prevalence of exchange rate against interest rate 
channel in the Central and Eastern newcomers is a common view across the literature. 
In addition to that major result, Creel and Levasseur (2005) highlight the weak impact 
of monetary policy on output and prices, an opposite conclusion to the one advocated by 
Elbourne and de Haan (2006). In order to contribute to that debate, VAR models will be 
estimated for the eight CEECs recently integrated into EU. Their features are depicted 
in the subsequent developments. 
 
3. Econometric concerns and methodological contributions 
The VAR model which is going to be estimated for each country is close to the one 
proposed by Peersman and Smets (2003) for the euro zone as a whole, subsequently 
used by Mojon and Peersman (2003) for each country. It will take the following shape:  
1
1
        (1)
n
t ti i t t
i
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=
= + +∑  
where  is the vector of endogenous,  the exogenous one and tY tX tµ  is a vector of 
i.i.d. shocks. 
Regarding , database consists of monthly series of industrial production and 
GDP , consumer prices , interest rates , nominal exchange rates
tY
)( ty )( tp )( tr
5 )( te , 
monetary  and domestic credit  aggregates from 1995:1 to 2004:9)( tm )( tdc
6. The two 
latter variables are alternatively included in the endogenous set to capture the important 
role played by money and credit stocks development in the monetary policies 
                                                 
5 In all this study, the exchange rate is quoted the following way: 1 euro or 1 dollar equals X unit of 
currency of the considered country. Consequently, when the exchange rate rises (resp. decreases), it 
means a depreciation (resp. an appreciation) of the considered country's currency. 
6 Due to the unavailability of Lithuanian industrial production on a longer sample period, Lithuanian 
model will be estimated over the 1998:1-2004:9 period. 
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implementations of these countries7. Used each one its turn, they will allow us to 
distinguish money supply shocks from money demand shocks ( , the broad monetary 
aggregate M2), and to assess the importance of credit channel for monetary policy 
transmission ( , the domestic credit aggregate). In the same fashion, we are going to 
estimate for each country a model including industrial production (IP), and another one 
with rebuilt series of GDP. Indeed, the use of monthly data is necessary for the sake of 
estimations significance and accuracy, but it imposes de facto the choice for IP as a 
proxy for output rather than GDP data, which are not observable at a monthly 
frequency. Nevertheless, the problems of industrial production as a measure of output 
are well-known. First, it offers only a partial view of the economy productive ability, 
and this partiality is likely to increase in countries where the share of industry is to 
shrink, like in every mature free-market economy. Second, comparisons of quarterly 
data of IP and GDP have widely emphasized the “procyclicity” and instability of IP 
related to GDP, which exhibits smoother evolutions across time. Consequently, 
estimations using IP are likely to be biased regarding monetary policy effect on output. 
Therefore, we decided to use rebuilt real GDP monthly data. The latter were computed 
by means of the Chow and Lin method (1971), which is used for instance by Eurostat to 
build quarterly national accounts for the euro area (see Eurostat, 1999)
tm
tdc
8. Eventually, we 
are able to provide a “ ” VAR estimation for each country22× 9, that is combining IP or 
GDP on the one hand to money or domestic credit on the other one. We can therefore 
study a broad range of monetary policy shocks, while performing consistent robustness 
checks at the same time. These are the main methodological contributions of our 
research.  
Turning to other variables, the referential used interest rate is the money market one, 
except for Slovak Republic, where deposit rate has to be used instead due to lack of 
                                                 
7 Except for Hungary, for which the observations of domestic credit started too late. A series of monetary 
aggregate (M2) starting in 1998 could be retrieved, however. The Hungarian model will therefore be 
estimated over the 1998:1-2004:9 period. 
8 The point is to use data related to GDP (here, monthly and quarterly data of industrial production) to 
estimate the coefficient of a regression equation for GDP at quarterly frequency. Roughly, the Chow and 
Lin (1971) method captures the correlation between the two variables in order to keep the cyclical 
component of monthly industrial production, but the statistical noise produced by the latter is “absorbed” 
in the residuals (supposed to be AR(1)) of the regression between the main and the auxiliary variables. 
Afterwards, the procedure allocates the residuals in order to produce GDP monthly estimates whose 
quarterly total equals the observed.  
9 Except for Poland and Latvia, where no reliable and long enough quarterly GDP series were available.  
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data. The exchange rate used is the bilateral one versus the euro for Czech and Slovak 
Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Conversely, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have 
extremely rigid fixed exchange rate regimes over all or the major part of the studied 
period10. For these countries, the inclusion of any exchange rate variable in their 
framework is pointless, since the parity with the referential currency is fixed, and the 
exchange rate with other currencies follows exactly the one of the referential currency11. 
Eventually, due to the specific monetary arrangement for Hungarian crawling band, the 
exchange and money market rates included in its framework are weighted averages of 
dollar (1/3) and euro ones (2/3). 
The exogenous set  includes European Union (EU-15) industrial production or 
rebuilt GDP and money market rate, as well as a broad commodity price index. 
Designed to proxy the external conditions faced by theses countries, these variables 
model CEECs integration to euro area and their sensitivity to a wide range of world 
supply shocks. Their exogenous status can be related to a standard hypothesis in small-
open economy models, that is, there is no feedback from the small countries to the 
bigger one. 
tX
Most of these series come from IFS (International Financial Statistics, IMF 
database). A few exceptions have to be mentioned however: data for Euro area output 
(industrial production and quarterly GDP) were extracted from Eurostat, while Estonian 
and Latvian ones are provided by national statistical offices – namely, the Statistical 
Office of Estonia and the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. For Hungary, M2 data 
comes from the Hungarian central bank. The choice of 1995 as the starting year of our 
study allows to perform estimations on a still relatively long period (almost ten years, 
117 points), but excluding the most unstable years of transition, minimizing then the 
bias produced by often brutal transformations of planned economies into free-market 
ones.  
Data consist of consumer prices index, industrial production, interest rate, nominal 
exchange rate and monetary/credit aggregate. All data are seasonally adjusted 
                                                 
10 Estonian Kroon has been in currency board with Deutsche Mark then with euro over all the considered 
period, while Latvia has a fixed peg with Special Drawing Rights with very tight (+/-1 %) margins. 
Lithuania had a currency board with US dollar until January 2002. 
11 A sensitivity analysis confirmed that the inclusion of the exchange rate in the set of exogenous 
variables, as proposed by Elbourne and de Haan (2005), does not alter our results, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively. 
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logarithms, except interest rates, used in their original shape. For checking time series 
persistence12, we used both ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and KPSS (Kwiawtowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992) tests. It appeared that the series were almost all 
integrated. In that case, the standard way of proceeding consists in finding cointegrating 
vectors using Johansen tests, supporting therefore the validity of regressions in levels. 
These standard trace tests support systematically the existence of at least one 
cointegrating vector, even two at the 5% level in most cases. However, a recursive 
computation of the trace statistic (Sephton and Larsen, 1991) and the correction for 
small sample bias proposed by Barkoulas and Baum (1997) seriously questioned the 
statistic robustness of these cointegrating equations for a big majority of the considered 
countries. Considering therefore that it was more reasonable not to impose rank 
restrictions, we decided to estimate the different VARs in levels. As shown by Sims et 
al. (1990), this still yields consistent estimates13.   
Eventually, some technical questions regarding estimations have to be addressed. 
Concerning shocks, they are recursively identified using the standard Cholesky-
decomposition with the variables ordered as follows: 
[ ]                /         (2)t t t t t t tY y p r e m dc=  
This ordering relies on standard assumptions related to the impact of monetary 
shocks on real sector in the short-run: basically, shocks on interest rate, exchange rate, 
money and credit do not affect contemporaneously the real sector, due to the sluggish 
reaction of  andty tp  (cf. Peersman and Smets, 2003). The ordering of monetary 
variables follows the one suggested by Gunduz (2003) and Creel and Levasseur (2005). 
Regarding the lag-order of the regressions, the endogenous variables enter the VAR 
with 3 lags following the recommendations of Akaike Information Criterion, which 
appeared preferable to the Schwartz Criterion in light of the short sample we are dealing 
with. In the remaining cases for which Akaike criterion advised a lower number of lags, 
we decided to maintain the choice for three, in order to preserve the comparability of 
our results. Besides, we do not allow for a contemporaneous impact of exogenous 
variables on endogenous, in order to model the delay between an exogenous shock and 
                                                 
12 All results from unit root tests, Johansen conventional and corrected cointegration tests are available 
upon request to the authors. 
13 This estimation strategy in presence of integrated series is more and more widely used in the VAR 
literature. See in particular Kim and Roubini (2000) and Elbourne and de Haan (2006). 
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its transmission to the domestic economy. Consequently, exogenous variables enter the 
estimation with one lag. 
  After performing standard Chow tests and recursive residual tests searching for 
structural breaks, we eventually included dummies tackling the effects of the late 
nineties financial crises and exchange rate regimes switching for some countries. When 
not sufficient, a few ones were parsimoniously added until getting normality of 
residuals. 
 
4. Estimations and comments 
4.1. Monetary policy effects: a general overlook 
For each country, we consider the effects of a one-standard deviation shock to 
interest rate, exchange rate, money and domestic credit on other variables. Therefore, 
tables 1a and 1b present a numerical synthesis of our results. For clarity purpose, all 
outcomes are not displayed for our “ 22× ” models. Thus, the tables report the peak 
responses of each endogenous variables and the month when it is reached, as well as the 
average monthly impact over a three-year period, for the VAR models including GDP, 
and only industrial production for the other ones. Besides, figures 1 to 8 depict selected 
OLS estimates based impulse response functions (thereafter IRFs), together with 
confidence bands (+/- 2 standard errors). When the considered shock comes from 
interest rate, exchange rate and, of course, the monetary aggregate, the reported 
responses are the ones from the VAR models including the monetary aggregate  - but 
it is worth emphasizing that the impulse responses of the alternative VARs including 
domestic credit are almost identical for , 
tm
ty tp , tr  and . Symmetrically, the impulse 
responses to a shock on the domestic credit aggregate are deduced from VARs 
including . In both cases, results are given for GDP and industrial production 
specifications: 
te
tdc
 
[Insert Tables 1a and 1b as well as Figures 1 to 8 here] 
 
Moreover, we led a robustness check of our results by examining the consequences 
of a switch from a Cholesky orthogonalization to generalized impulses (Pesaran and 
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Shin, 1998). Indeed, this approach is less restrictive than the Cholesky’s one, since it 
does not require orthogonalization of shocks and is invariant to the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR. In other words, Cholesky orthogonalization asks for supporting 
hypotheses that are not needed by generalized impulses. However, it is striking to see 
that Cholesky and generalized impulses (available upon request to the author) were very 
similar, almost identical for some of them. Therefore, it seems that the Cholesky 
impulses used in the analysis reflects fairly well the consequences of shocks. 
A general sight on IRFs emphasize a striking fact: whatever the type of output 
included in the estimation (GDP or industrial production), the reactions of other 
endogenous ( tp , tr ,  and ) to shocks are very similar regarding sign and size, even 
when the reactions of GDP and industrial production are quite significantly different 
(see for example, the responses to an exchange rate shock in Slovak Republic, or to a 
money innovation in Slovenia). However, the significance may be occasionally affected 
in a way or another. Further analysis on monetary policy effect is now going to be made 
on a shock-by-shock basis.  
te tm
Starting with the interest rate, our results highlight that a monetary policy tightening 
leads to the expected contraction of output for most of the countries, but not of prices. 
Regarding output, responses are always negative and significant in most cases (apart 
from Slovak Republic, Hungary and to a lesser extent, Slovenia). Maximum reactions 
rank from -0.10 to -1.01 % for GDP, and from -0.17 to -2.23 % for industrial 
production. Furthermore, the months of peaking, from 3 to 8 months for GDP, are not 
only totally in line with the usual delays for monetary policy transmission usually 
empasized in the literature (cf. Svensson, 2003), but are also almost identical to the ones 
found by the related literature dealing with old EMU members on quarterly data (cf 
Mojon and Peersman, 2003). Here we see one of the main interests of using rebuilt GDP 
data: while remaining consistent and significant, the reactions of industrial production 
can seem a bit strong and overdelayed for a couple of countries (Czech Republic and 
Estonia) in comparison to GDP behavior. Eventually, the effects of the interest rate 
shock die away after 6 to 12 months for GDP, and 6 to 16 months for industrial 
production, in accordance with theory regarding long-run neutrality of monetary policy 
on output.   
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The situation is very different for prices, however. They exhibit various reactions to 
a policy rate shock, either positive or negative, in any cases non significant (apart a 
weakly significant decrease for Slovenia). A noticeable exception, however, is the case 
of Czech Republic (cf. infra). For this country, we are confronted to a very common 
problem in VAR literature, the one of “price puzzle”, i.e. prices increase following a 
rise in interest rates14. However, it seems that we can relate this counter-intuitive 
behavior to another one: indeed, Czech Republic exhibits also a depreciation (i.e. an 
increase) of exchange rate following the monetary tightening. Occurring instead of the 
expected appreciation, this “exchange rate” puzzle rises import prices, and thus 
accelerates domestic inflation, especially in a (very) small opened economy. Creel and 
Levasseur (2005) rationalize this exchange rate puzzle in terms of market expectations 
regarding the sustainability of sovereign debt, the probability of default increasing with 
the interest rate, especially if the levels of government debt and deficits are already 
high. If economic policies are not credible, then an increase in interest rate will lead 
market participants to sell their assets in national currency, allowing the depreciation to 
occur. The intuition seems indeed to fit fairly well the Czech case: even if its ratio of 
government debt over GDP is only the fourth of our sample in 2004 (behind Hungary, 
Poland and Slovak republic), its expansion went undeniably much quicker than any 
other since the end of the nineties, due to massive fiscal deficits15. For all other 
concerned countries, there is no problem of exchange rate puzzle: a positive shock to 
the interest rate leads either to a significant appreciation of the exchange rate (Hungary, 
Poland and to a lesser extent Slovak Republic) or to a non-distinguishable from zero 
reaction (Slovenia). In the same fashion, the response of the monetary aggregate is as 
expected negative and significant across all eight countries, with a peak ranking 
between 0.43 and 1.48 %. Conversely, domestic credit responses to an interest rate 
shock (available upon request) are never significant, apart from a decrease in Estonia. 
This lack of domestic credit response to a monetary tightening can be suitably explained 
in terms of structural permanent excess in banking sector liquidity over the last decade, 
                                                 
14 Many solutions have been proposed to solve this price puzzle, but without much lasting success. The 
inclusion of a broad commodity price index, originally suggested by Sims (1992), has been shown to be 
insufficient to solve the puzzle, which is confirmed by our estimations, at least for Czech Republic. We 
also tested Giordani’s (2004) recent proposition of simultaneous inclusion of output and output gap in the 
VAR, in order to mimic IS and Philips curves, without getting any change in prices behavior. 
15 All government debt and deficit figures available from Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int), 
headings “Economy and Finance – National Accounts”. 
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due to the strong capital inflows in the context of relatively fixed exchange rate policies 
before the switch of the late 1990s (cf. Creel and Levasseur, 2005; Kierzenkowski, 
2005). In any case, this undermines the idea of a credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission stricto sensu for the considered countries, in the sense that an innovation 
on interest rate fails to influence significantly the level of credit supplied by banks. 
However, this situation is likely to get modified since the end of the nineties (cf. infra). 
Turning to the consequences of an exchange rate shock, we temporarily switch the 
focus away from the countries under a fully or at least strongly fixed exchange rate 
regime over all the period (Estonia and Latvia), or a major part of it (Lithuania). For all 
others, impulse responses to the exchange rate reveal one major outcome, that is, a 
depreciation of the exchange rate always leads to a significant (apart from Poland) 
increase of prices, ranking from 0.11 to 0.35 %. For Hungary, Slovakia and, to a lesser 
extent Poland, this is especially interesting, since an interest rate rise leads to an 
appreciation of exchange rate (cf. supra). This could mean that an interest rate variation 
has an indirect impact on prices going trough the exchange rate channel, instead of 
direct one. Besides, this interpretation is consistent with theory in terms of transmission 
delays, that is, monetary policy actions affect prices after output (cf. Svensson, 2003). 
Indeed, if we use the sum of the two shocks delays as an approximation of the real 
transmission timing of an interest rate shock to prices, it leads to a lagged effect of 
interest rate shock to prices (peaks between 8 and 13 months, substantial significant 
effects lasting up to two years) relatively to output. Conversely, an exchange rate shock 
generally does not affect significantly output – apart from a puzzling slightly significant 
contraction for Slovak Republic. Its impact on interest rate is mixed: while leading to 
non-significant contractions in Poland and Slovak Republic, significant increases are 
stated for the three other countries. The latter are fully consistent with the predominant 
monetary rate regime over the period: inflation targeting and managed float for Czech 
Republic, crawling bands for Hungary and “highly” managed float16 for Slovenia. 
When the considered shock is a money innovation, the responses of prices are all 
consistent, i.e. positive, but rarely significant (only for Estonia and Slovenia). 
Concerning output, the money shock brings a significant positive reaction of GDP for 
                                                 
16 In December 2003, International Monetary Fund used to classify Slovenia among the countries with 
“exchange rates within crawling bands”, stating that “the regime operating de facto in the country is 
different from the de jure regime”. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2003/eng/1203.htm. 
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Estonia, Lithuania and to a lesser extent, Slovenia; regarding industrial production, 
significant increases are seen for Estonia and Lithuania again, and also for Hungary and 
Poland. In all other cases, the responses of output are insignificant or negative. All in 
all, there does not seem to be an overwhelming cross-country evidence of money 
innovations on output and prices. The diagnosis is even clearer for exchange rate, which 
fails to respond significantly to a money shock for all countries, except Poland, where a 
depreciation by 1.1 % occurs after four months. It is worth noticing that this evidence in 
favor of an overall weak impact of money on main macroeconomic variables is similar 
to the one found by Sims (1992) on France, Germany, Japan and UK. Regarding interest 
rate, conventional wisdom would expect an interest rate decrease following the money 
shock; however, Reichenstein (1987) or Leeper and Gordon (1991), showed that this a 
priori causality did not hold for all countries at all moments of time, and could even be 
reversed in some periods. This is the case mainly for Hungary and Latvia, and to a 
lesser extent for Czech Republic. This positive correlation may be interpreted as a will 
of the central banker of not accommodating a money growth, this effect dominating the 
liquidity one. For all other countries, the response is not significantly different from 
zero, except for Estonia where the standard liquidity effect occurs after four months (-
0.36 %), but disappears quickly during the third semester of the shock. 
Eventually, the last shock to be considered is the one on domestic credit. In the 
context of our analysis, one could consider this is not such an important problem to deal 
with, since a policy interest rate shock fails to train any significant reaction from credit 
in most cases (cf. supra). Nevertheless, we would like to raise two points. First, it is 
likely that the macroeconomic stabilization and especially the switch from relatively 
fixed to floating exchange rates will have given a growing role to the credit channel (cf. 
next subsection). Secondly, the transition process has seen a radical financial mutation 
in the considered countries, with numerous banking and financial innovations likely to 
have generated demand-driven credit shocks. Both points emphasize therefore it is still 
useful and relevant to know the consequence of a credit shock on other endogenous. In 
any case, the impact of a positive innovation to credit on output is very weak, since it 
brings a significant positive response of GDP only for Estonia, and a significant positive 
response of industrial production for Estonia again and, to a lesser extent, for Lithuania. 
For all other countries, the reaction is either non distinguishable form zero or even 
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negative for Latvia. It is not much more efficient for influencing prices: if their reaction 
is always positive across the eight CEECs, only two are significantly different from zero 
(Czech Republic and Poland). This weak influence on the two main policy goals usually 
assigned to the monetary policymaker leads us to confirm the absence of a direct credit 
channel over all the sample period. However, it seems that the policymaker wants to 
monitor credit evolutions in a majority of countries, since a shock to the domestic credit 
aggregate generates a significant positive reaction for Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic. The latter peaks between 0.28 and 0.46 %, with 
a delay varying between one and five trimesters. For some countries (Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovak Republic), the effects can be quite persistent, up to two years. 
Eventually, a credit expansion leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate for the sole 
Slovak Republic; it is followed by an appreciation, but the overall effect seems close to 
zero. 
On the whole, our analysis emphasizes several important outcomes. Indeed, 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms of the eight new EU members exhibit several 
important features similar to the ones of actual euro zone members. The two most 
important are the short-run and non-lasting contraction of output following a monetary 
policy tightening, and the overall weak impact of money stock variations. An important 
dissimilarity remain, however: a positive innovation to the interest rate fails to generate 
a decrease of prices. For countries under a strongly fixed exchange rate regime (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), this might not be a problem. It is indeed likely that their hard-fixed 
peg allowed them to import durable disinflation, and that inflation is now low and 
stabilized by this systematic monetary policy directed toward exchange rate fixity. If 
this reasoning can still hold for Slovenia (whose managed floating was actually close to 
crawling bands, see supra), it is not the case for the others, where the exchange rate 
channel is still decisive regarding prices evolutions. The purpose of the next subsection 
is notably to assess how problematic this is in the perspective of euro adhesion. 
 
4.2. Variance decompositions 
The purpose of this analysis (generalizing and completing the one performed in 
Creel and Levasseur, 2005) is to provide complements to the previous ones by 
separating the variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the 
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VAR. Consequently, the variance decompositions provide interesting information about 
the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the 
VAR. For clarity, tables 2a to 2h below reports the variance decompositions at a twelve-
month horizon only for the VAR specification including GDP and domestic credit, over 
the full sample and a sub-sample (1999:1-2004:9), in order to gauge possible evolutions 
over the recent years17. Indeed, we had previously noticed that industrial production 
data used to generate more perturbations in the estimations, which was confirmed by 
much more important standard errors (sometimes twice higher than in the GDP-VARs) 
when studying variances for IP-VARs. It seemed therefore relevant to focus on the 
specification generating the lesser possible noise, in order to identify more precisely the 
different components of variances. Finally, we chose to retain  instead of  in 
accordance with our previous results, which highlighted a general very weak part of  
in monetary transmission mechanisms. In that spirit, it also seemed more interesting to 
check if a credit channel was emerging or not in some countries.  
tdc tm
tm
 
[Insert Tables 2a to 2h here] 
 
A first comparative look on the full sample and sub-sample period generally 
emphasizes the growing part of the exchange rate for absorbing demand and supply 
shocks or shocks to GDP and prices, in Poland and Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Indeed, whereas real shocks altogether explain 18% (Slovak Republic) to 36% (Czech 
Republic) of exchange rate variance over the all period, their contribution ranks from 36 
% (Slovak Republic) to 54 % (Czech Republic) over the sub-sample. At first sight, this 
shows how costly it would be for these countries to give up the nominal exchange rate, 
questioning therefore the relevance of monetary integration in a near future. Conversely, 
the part of exchange rate as a shock absorber is insignificantly small in Hungary (around 
5%) and falling from 42 to 13.5 % in Slovenia. It is not quite surprising for both of 
them, since their currencies have been in semi--fixed exchange rate regimes (a de jure 
crawling band for Hungary until August 2001, a de facto one for Slovenia until end-
2003) over most of the considered period. Like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, their 
                                                 
17 All variance decompositions resulting from the other possible identification schemes are available upon 
request to the author. 
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monetary policies have always been directed toward an exchange rate target, so they 
would suffer only little costs by giving up the nominal exchange rate. 
Turning the focus on the evolution of the different monetary policy transmission 
channels, several very interesting features arise. A first very important result is the 
growing part of the interest rate channel for all the considered countries, except Estonia 
and Latvia: representing between 5 and 30 % of real shocks variances over all the 
sample period, they represent until 47 % over the sub-period. For Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovenia, the interest rate channel has even overcome the exchange rate one.  
Secondly, in the context of the results found in the previous subsection, it is striking to 
see the growing part of interest rate shock in explaining prices variance. The evolution 
is truly marginal for Estonia, Latvia or Slovak Republic, but pretty massive for the five 
other countries, in particular for Czech Republic (from 9.6 to 26.3%), Poland (from 6.8 
to 13.1%) and Slovenia (from 2.4 to 20.5%). It means that, if monetary policy fails to 
train a significant reaction of inflation over the whole period, this situation is likely 
changing over the most recent years. This is quite good news in the perspective of euro 
adhesion.  
Eventually, the growing share of interest rate in credit variance seems to support the 
hypothesis of a developing credit channel in most of the studied countries. Apart from 
Estonia, where the contribution of interest rate to credit variance decreases over the sub-
sample, all other countries see the impact of interest rate on credit increasing, with an 
especially sharp trend for Czech Republic (from 0.9 to 37.9%), Latvia (from 2.8 to 
14.6%) and Slovenia (from 2.24 to 18.34%). This is a quite important phenomenon, 
especially for the countries where credit itself seems to have a rising impact on output 
and prices, i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia. Conversely, its influence is 
decreasing in Czech and Slovak Republic, and it is not possible to make interperiod 
comparisons for Hungary and Lithuania. 
On the whole, there seem to be some common trends among the eight EU new 
members, with an increasing importance of interest rate channel, especially on prices, 
and a developing credit channel in a majority of them. The outcomes of this variance 
analysis show therefore a convergence of monetary policy transmission mechanisms 
toward euro area standards (i.e. a predominant role of interest rate for influencing output 
and prices, supported by a credit channel), providing some rationale for optimism 
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regarding a not to far adoption of the euro in most considered countries. Among 
countries in floating or non-purely fixed exchange rate regimes, the loss of nominal 
exchange rate for absorbing shocks is certainly bad news for some of them, but other 
elements (rising influence of interest rate channel and credit channel) are really positive. 
In any case, Slovak Republic seems probably the country which has the more to lose to 
a quick integration into euro: it cumulates a dominating exchange rate, both as a shock 
absorber and a channel of monetary policy transmission, and still weak interest rate and 
credit channels. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provided new empirical evidence regarding the monetary policy 
transmission channels and their relative importance of each for the eight CEECs 
recently integrated in EU. This has been done estimating different VAR models for each 
country, including alternatively money and domestic credit on the one hand, and 
industrial production and rebuilt series of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the other 
hand.Our results moderate seriously the actual view in the empirical literature, which 
uses to consider the exchange rate as the prevailing channel of monetary policy 
transmission for the CEECs. If exchange still plays an important part for transmitting 
monetary policy and absorbing shocks, it is declining relatively to interest rate channel 
and even to the credit one. For all countries, monetary policy transmission mechanisms 
already present important similarities with those of the old euro area members, but also 
seem to keep converging toward their standards – apart from Slovak Republic.  
Consequently, we can be reasonably optimistic regarding the perspective of a close 
integration of these countries into euro. In that sense, we are driven, by different means, 
to conclusions close to the ones of Coricelli and Jazbec (2004). For the immediate 
future, the forthcoming adhesion to euro of Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia appears 
quite legitimate and relevant. 
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Table 1a: Peak impacts of monetary shocks  
 
  shock to interest rate     shock to exchange rate     
  GDP CPI EXR MON IP GDP CPI MIR MON IP 
cze -0.44 (5) 0.29 (4) 0.42 (3) -0.95 (2) -0.33 (12) 0.15 (6) 0.35 (7) 0.39 (13) -0.52 (15) 0.24 (6) 
 0.16 0.08 0.27 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.27 
est -0.52 (8) -0.10 (8) NR -1.48 (4) -0.74 (11) NR NR NR NR NR 
 0.20 0.16 NR 0.51 0.36 NR NR NR NR NR 
hun -0.06 (6) -0.17 (11) -1.02 (6) -0.19 (1) -0.62 (8) 0.11 (8) 0.24 (7)  0.50 (6) 0.29 (1) 0.66 (2) 
 0.09 0.11 0.54 0.13 0.51 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.38 
lat NA 0.14 (7) NR -0.98 (2) -0.97 (7) NR NR NR NR NR 
 NA 0.09 NR 0.32 0.40 NR NR NR NR NR 
lit -1.01 (4) -0.08 (2) NR -1.26 (5) -2.23 (3) NR NR NR NR NR 
 0.45 0.08 NR 0.56 1.25 NR NR NR NR NR 
pol NA 0.15 (10) -2.21 (5) -1.44 (5) -0.86 (14) NA 0.11 (3) -0.18 (4) 0.64 (2) 0.69 (2) 
 NA 0.16 0.46 0.44 0.42 NA 0.07 0.11 0.34 0.34 
slk -0.10 (3) -0.04 (11) -0.38 (4) -0.43 (3) -0.17 (3) -0.26 (3) 0.32 (8) -0.20 (14) 0.48 (19) -0.46 (5) 
 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.34 0.31 
slv -0.13 (5) -0.12 (3) 0.20 (8) -0.85 (3) -0.34 (3) 0.16 (9) 0.17 (5) 0.47 (3) -0.55 (4) 0.14 (9) 
 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.35 0.23 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.34 0.11 
           
  shock to money     shock to domestic credit   
  GDP CPI MIR EXR IP GDP CPI MIR EXR IP 
cze -0.12 (2) 0.09 (5) 0.26 (3) -0.20 (7) -0.30 (11) -0.21 (5) 0.23 (11) 0.28 (15) 0.64 (4) -0.38 (3) 
 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.28 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.26 0.34 
est 0.67 (7) 0.16 (3) -0.36 (4) NR 1.36 (7) 0.78 (2) 0.09 (2) 0.09 (9) NR 0.54 (2) 
 0.17 0.12 0.18 NR 0.32 0.31 0.06 0.08 NR 0.42 
hun -0.33 (2) 0.09 (10) 0.41 (7) 0.75 (6) 0.83 (4) NA NA NA NA NA 
 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.53 0.50 NA NA NA NA NA 
lat NA 0.11 (4) 0.30 (5) NR 0.14 (3) NA 0.07 (11) 0.42 (5) NR -0.64 (10)
 NA 0.07 0.11 NR 0.39 NA 0.08 0.11 NR 0.29 
lit 0.95 (2) 0.04 (2) 0.08 (5) NR 1.30 (9) 0.26 (10) 0.12 (3) 0.39 (3) NR 2.11 (3) 
 0.30 0.08 0.11 NR 0.72 0.34 0.10 0.17 NR 1.29 
pol NA 0.28 (22) 0.13 (6) 1.12 (4) 0.59 (5) NA 0.34 (12) 0.46 (6) -0.79 (10) 0.36 (3) 
 NA 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.25 NA 0.13 0.11 0.42 0.51 
slk 0.07 (3) 0.12 (2) -0.07 (2) -0.37 (7) 0.34 (2) 0.13 (10) 0.01 (7) 0.38 (12) 0.39 (3) 0.19 (16) 
 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.31 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.26 
slv 0.22 (3) 0.14 (4) 0.17 (5) -0.17 (12) -0.58 (3) 0.08 (4) 0.06 (9) -0.14 (15) 0.17 (5) 0.14 (8) 
 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.16 
 
Month of peaking in parentheses. Standard errors in italic. NA: non available, NR: non relevant. 
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Table 1b: Average impacts over 36 months of monetary shocks 
  shock to interest rate     shock to exchange rate     
  GDP CPI EXR MON IP GDP CPI MIR MON IP 
cze -0.18 0.16 0.25 -0.39 -0.17 -0.10 0.19 0.23 -0.39 -0.20 
 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.25 0.13 
est -0.09 -0.03 NR -0.36 -0.20 NR NR NR NR NR 
 0.05 0.06 NR 0.18 0.15 NR NR NR NR NR 
hun -0.01 -0.03 -0.21 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.12 
 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.13 
lat NA 0.06 NA -0.25 -0.42 NR NR NR NR NR 
 NA 0.08 NA 0.20 0.28 NR NR NR NR NR 
lit -0.28 -0.04 NR -0.52 -0.82 NR NR NR NR NR 
 0.19 0.07 NR 0.31 0.53 NR NR NR NR NR 
pol NA 0.06 -0.85 -0.71 -0.55 NA 0.06 -0.04 0.25 0.18 
 NA 0.28 0.75 0.67 0.36 NA 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.11 
slk -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.43 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.16 0.23 -0.14 
 0.10 0.11 0.28 0.43 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.15 
slv -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.15 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.04 
           
 shock to money   shock to domestic credit  
  GDP CPI MIR EXR IP GDP CPI MIR EXR IP 
cze -0.05 0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.12 -0.09 0.11 0.18 0.19 -0.20 
 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.12 
est 0.22 0.06 -0.01 NR 0.54 0.12 -0.10 0.03 NR 0.26 
 0.09 0.11 0.03 NR 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.02 NR 0.16 
hun -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.16 NA NA NA NA NA 
 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.17 NA NA NA NA NA 
lat NA 0.07 0.18 NR -0.05 NA 0.02 0.08 NR -0.29 
 NA 0.04 0.09 NR 0.11 NA 0.06 0.04 NR 0.17 
lit NA 0.00 0.01 NR 0.64 0.13 0.05 0.03 NR -0.07 
 NA 0.07 0.04 NR 0.59 0.21 0.06 0.03 NR 0.30 
pol NA 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.14 NA 0.47 0.56 -0.50 -0.04 
 NA 0.12 0.11 0.28 0.15 NA 0.26 0.28 0.54 0.31 
slk -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.43 -0.21 0.04 
 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.27 0.23 0.12 
slv -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.13 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 
 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 
Standard errors in italic. NA: non available, NR: non relevant. 
 
Figures 1A: Czech Republic 
Response to a shock to  the interest rate 
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Figures 1B: Czech Republic 
Response to a shock to the exchange rate 
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Figures 1C: Czech Republic 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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Figures 1D: Czech Republic 
Response to a shock to the domestic credit  aggregate 
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Figures 2A: Estonia 
Response to a shock to the interest rate 
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Figures 2B: Estonia 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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Figures 2C: Estonia 
Response to a shock to the domestic credit  aggregate 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of GDP
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of prices
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of interest rate
 
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of industrial production
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of prices
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of  interest rate
 29
Figures 3A: Hungary 
Response to a shock to the interest rate 
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Figures 3B: Hungary 
Response to a shock to the exchange rate 
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Figures 3C Hungary 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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     Figures 4A Latvia         Figures 4B Latvia        Figures 4C Latvia 
Response to a shock to the   Response to a shock to the   Response to a shock to  the 
interest rate        monetary aggregate      domestic credit aggregate 
 
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of industrial production
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of prices
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of money
 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of industrial production
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of prices
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of interest rate
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of industrial production
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of prices
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Response of interest rate
 
 33
Figures 5A Lithuania 
Response to a shock to the interest rate 
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Figures 5B Lithuania 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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Figures 5C Lithuania 
Response to a shock to the domestic credit aggregate 
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Figures 6A: Poland 
Response to a shock to the interest rate 
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Figures 6B: Poland 
Response to a shock to the exchange rate 
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Figures 6C: Poland 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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Figures 6D: Poland 
Response to a shock to the domestic credit aggregate  
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Figures 7A: Slovak Republic 
Response to a shock to the interest rate 
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Figures 7B: Slovak Republic 
Response to a shock to the exchange rate 
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Figures 7C Slovak Republic 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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Figures 7d: Slovak Republic 
Response to a shock to the domestic credit  aggregate 
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Figures 8A: Slovenia 
Response to a shock to the interest rate 
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Figures 8B: Slovenia 
Response to a shock to the exchange rate 
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Figures 8C: Slovenia 
Response to a shock to the monetary aggregate 
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Figures 8D: Slovenia 
Response to a shock to the domestic credit  aggregate 
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Table 2a: Czech Republic 
 
Full sample 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
GDP 2.36 71.73 3.74 20.10 0.53 3.90 
Prices 1.59 5.15 47.65 9.62 23.05 14.53 
Interest rate 2.20 1.67 14.22 66.52 4.49 13.10 
Exchange rate 4.72 20.43 15.27 5.29 48.64 10.36 
Credit 6.95 22.53 13.66 0.87 10.69 52.25 
1999:1-2004:9 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
GDP 2.12 62.19 9.94 20.55 4.25 3.07 
Prices 0.93 9.24 48.79 26.34 7.50 8.13 
Interest rate 0.66 35.12 18.04 40.51 5.53 0.81 
Exchange rate 3.87 26.50 27.67 20.06 22.47 3.30 
Credit 6.75 7.33 29.83 37.89 7.11 17.85 
 
 
Table 2b: Estonia 
 
Full sample 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Credit 
GDP 3.92 86.89 2.12 4.66 6.32 
Prices 2.51 6.07 90.79 0.39 2.76 
Interest rate 2.27 2.19 1.36 95.64 0.81 
Credit 8.15 17.89 17.54 11.58 53.00 
1999:1-2004:9 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Credit 
GDP 3.74 80.20 3.72 2.92 13.16 
Prices 1.12 18.41 76.02 0.52 5.05 
Interest rate 0.59 2.94 9.75 79.91 7.40 
Credit 4.81 18.81 5.22 8.48 67.49 
 
 
Table 2c: Hungary 
 
1998:1-2004:9 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Money 
GDP 1.13 61.22 12.74 1.88 12.75 11.42 
Prices 1.04 3.45 41.73 11.93 37.81 5.08 
Interest rate 2.01 1.92 4.92 31.37 40.19 21.61 
Exchange rate 4.58 2.56 2.43 29.47 55.36 10.18 
Money 1.40 3.45 4.58 6.48 11.20 74.29 
 
 
Table 2d: Latvia 
 
Full sample 
 S.E. IP Prices Interest rate Credit 
IP 6.97 83.36 0.81 9.41 6.41 
Prices 1.67 5.46 90.13 3.63 0.78 
Interest rate 2.00 3.65 11.37 66.21 18.77 
Credit 7.85 15.90 3.86 2.78 77.46 
1999:1-2004:9 
 S.E. IP Prices Interest rate Credit 
IP 7.29 57.99 30.72 3.04 8.25 
Prices 1.85 1.76 90.71 4.61 2.92 
Interest rate 1.16 6.82 25.60 62.07 5.51 
Credit 7.07 23.63 3.35 14.60 58.42 
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Table 2e: Lithuania 
 
1998:1-2004:9 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Credit 
GDP 5.06 73.50 17.00 7.68 1.81 
Prices 1.45 20.19 69.85 5.45 4.51 
Interest rate 1.70 13.29 7.53 65.72 13.46 
Credit 13.27 7.68 16.72 5.74 69.85 
 
Table 2f: Poland 
 
Full sample 
 S.E. IP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
IP 4.92 77.21 5.56 5.54 10.11 1.58 
Prices 2.01 39.09 31.97 6.79 6.59 15.56 
Interest rate 2.42 10.62 7.76 49.70 1.14 30.78 
Exchange rate 7.74 7.42 24.94 16.05 45.12 6.48 
Credit 4.28 8.87 20.49 13.19 6.90 50.56 
1999:1-2004:9 
 S.E. IP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
IP 4.29 83.94 1.79 6.86 3.28 4.13 
Prices 1.48 39.11 15.39 13.10 1.80 30.61 
Interest rate 1.80 25.71 8.41 40.43 3.33 22.12 
Exchange rate 6.45 45.09 6.67 16.47 23.15 8.62 
Credit 3.32 14.06 11.62 18.49 6.73 49.10 
 
Table 2g: Slovak Republic 
 
Full sample 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
GDP 1.44 85.99 0.91 2.18 6.28 4.64 
Prices 1.81 2.05 81.56 3.64 12.15 0.60 
Interest rate 1.72 4.51 0.83 72.23 0.89 21.54 
Exchange rate 4.07 11.36 6.81 0.34 61.44 20.05 
Credit 15.14 1.11 7.41 2.21 1.55 87.72 
1999:1-2004:9 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
GDP 1.01 75.74 8.71 8.21 3.97 3.36 
Prices 2.21 16.27 64.11 3.93 15.40 0.29 
Interest rate 0.98 16.24 3.40 69.77 10.10 0.49 
Exchange rate 3.83 11.60 25.34 1.42 57.83 3.81 
Credit 6.11 5.88 4.57 3.65 9.09 76.81 
 
Table 2h: Slovenia 
Full sample 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
GDP 1.66 84.04 6.22 4.15 4.52 1.07 
Prices 0.98 8.63 71.22 2.42 14.42 3.31 
Interest rate 2.32 8.06 25.83 51.52 13.80 0.79 
Exchange rate 2.12 9.20 32.71 8.31 46.53 3.24 
Credit 4.50 2.66 2.52 2.24 17.55 75.03 
1999:1-2004:9 
 S.E. GDP Prices Interest rate Exchange rate Credit 
GDP 1.34 80.43 6.59 5.91 4.94 2.13 
Prices 1.26 18.96 52.87 20.45 4.34 3.38 
Interest rate 1.06 0.80 18.06 56.07 6.96 18.12 
Exchange rate 0.93 12.65 1.89 51.82 32.49 1.16 
Credit 7.59 0.54 6.39 18.34 12.16 62.56 
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